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Understanding Radicalization and Engagement in Terrorism
through Religious Conversion Motifs
Abstract
Although research into the processes and outcomes of radicalization has yielded significant
discoveries regarding antecedent risk factors and the role played by societal circumstances
and individual variables, research regarding the process of radical conversion remains in
its infancy. We believe that the psychology of religion may hold the key to unlocking new
insights into this conversion process. As a result of assessing both Lofland and Skonovd’s
religious conversion motifs and Rambo’s integrative model of religious conversion, we
suggest that issues of culture, society and the individual which are prevalent in first-hand
accounts of conversion to terrorism provide crucial insight into the application of theories
of religious conversion to the process of radicalization, and that this application is ripe for
helping to further develop existing pyramid and staircase models of radicalization.
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Introduction
In order to counter violent extremism, efforts must be made to stem the
tide of new recruits. To do this effectively, more needs to be known about
the radicalization processes involved in people altering their beliefs and
moving towards engaging in violent extremism.1 With regards to these
issues, the present article will initially explore the antecedent factors of
radicalization and involvement in violent extremism, which are well
supported by research. The article will then suggest how research from
the psychology of religion could be incorporated into this work to provide
a model for further exploring radicalization and engagement in terrorism.
Since 9/11 there has been an increase in both the supply and demand for
research focusing on terrorism, and the rise of Islamic terrorism. A
particular fascination has been with the psychology of the terrorist and the
radicalization process that transforms normal young men into fanatics
determined to kill for ideology.2 Unfortunately, research on terrorism and
radicalization has a tendency to lack adequate data or utilize poor
methodological practices.3 This poor practice, the problematic nature of
the terms under investigation—such as ‘terrorism’ or ‘radicalization’—plus
the lack of dedicated researchers working in the area, has led to a mediacentric focus purveying incorrect assumptions of psychological instability.4
A comprehensive review of the research suggests that an understanding of
a terrorist’s mind and motivations requires a more thorough and
comprehensive analysis of factors; an analysis that moves away from the
readily available intra-individual explanations toward an understanding of
social factors and the socio-political history of the community that play
into the radicalization process.5 Although much research is hindered by its
reliance on secondary data, or lack of direct contact with the individuals in
question, there have been salient discoveries made by researchers.6

1 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism I: A review of social science
theories,” Journal of Strategic Security 4 (2011): 7-36.
2 Horgan, John, The psychology of terrorism (London: Routledge, 2005).
3 Ibid; Andrew Silke, “The Devil you know: Continuing problems with research on
terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (2001): 1–14.
4 Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism”; Andrew Silke, “Preface” in A. Silke
(ed.), Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and
its consequences (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2003), xiii–xxi; Mark
Burgess, Neil Ferguson and Ian Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From
discontent to action,” in Marget Sönser-Breen (eds.), Minding evil: Explorations of
human iniquity (Amsterdam/New York: Rodolpi, 2005), 19–38.
5 Jeff Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological
approaches,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49:1 (2005): 3-42.
6Andrew Silke, “Cheshire-cat logic: The recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in
psychological research,” Psychology, Crime and Law 4:1 (1998): 51-69.
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Antecedents of Terrorism
Research has developed a range of antecedent risk factors that consistently
have the potential to increase the likelihood of individuals’ involvement
with terror groups or a campaign of armed insurrection.7 Many of these
factors are well documented, for example, the repeated existence of a
grievance or perceived injustice by a subgroup of the population.8 Age and
gender are also important considerations, with terrorist acts generally
committed by young males aged fifteen to twenty-five. Jihadist
movements primarily focus their recruitment on unmarried males in their
late teens or early twenties.9
An individual’s family and friends having a past involvement with or
showing support for the movement have also been shown to be key, with
strong bonds with family and friends, rather than behavioral disorders,
suggested as the key motivating factor for young Muslims joining the
jihad.10 Indeed recent research discussed by Bond has further
demonstrated that three out of every four foreign fighters currently
travelling to Syria to fight, do so as clusters of friends.11
High levels of community support for the insurgent group is commonly
cited as an important factor in radicalization.12 Being a terrorist places
Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From
discontent to action”; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of
political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism,” Terrorism & Political Violence
20 (2008): 425:433.
8 Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From
discontent to action”; Martha Crenshaw, “The causes of terrorism” in Charles W.
Kegley, Jr. (ed.), The new global terrorism: Characteristics, causes, controls (Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 92-138.
9 Andrew Silke, “Becoming a terrorist,” in A. Silke (ed.), Terrorists, victims and
society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences (Chichester,
England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 2003), 29–53; Horgan John, “The search for the
terrorist personality,” in A. Silke (ed.), Psychological perspectives on terrorism and
its consequences (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2003), 3-27.
10 Rachel, Brett and Irma Specht, Young soldiers: Why they choose to fight (UK:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004); Colin, Crawford, Inside the UDA: Volunteers
and violence (London: Pluto Press, 2003); Anne Speckhard, “Defusing human
bombs: Understanding suicide terrorism,” in J. Victoroff (Ed.), Tangled roots: Social
and psychological factors in the genesis of terrorism (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006),
277–291; Sageman, Mark, Understanding terror networks (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
11 Michael Bond, “Why Westerners are driven to join the jihadist fight,” News
Scientist, September 10, 2014, available at:
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329861.700-why-westerners-aredriven-to-join-the-jihadist-fight.html#.VQLIAvysX_E.
12 Mark Burgess, Neil Ferguson and Ian Hollywood, “Rebels’ perspectives of the legacy
of past violence and of the current peace in post-agreement Northern Ireland: An
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis,” Political Psychology 28:1 (2007): 69-88;
Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita M. Denny, “The terrorists in their own
words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists,” Terrorism and
Political Violence 15 (2003): 171–184.
7

17
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss1/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.1.1430

Ferguson and Binks: Understanding Radicalization

immense physical, psychological, and social burdens on the individual;
they can be isolated, face death, or imprisonment.13 Yet these risks are
outweighed by gaining status, respect, and esteem within their community
and the possibility that membership may also bring financial and/or
sexual rewards, as well as increased social status.14
One of the most consistent findings from research dealing with the reasons
people engage in terrorism is having a need for vengeance or reporting a
desire to ‘hit back’ and right wrongs.15 The personal histories of armed
insurgents from across the globe are frequently filled with stories about
incidents in which they, their acquaintances, or communities are
victimized by ‘the other’—pushing the protagonist to take action, seek
revenge, and join an armed group.
The routes into violence may be long, and eventual membership tends to
be the result of an incremental process of increasing acts of insurgence.16
This process may start with relatively mundane behavior such as stone
throwing or spray painting graffiti before progressing to destroying
property and finally becoming involved in injuring and killing opponents.17
For example, many of the paramilitaries and ex-combatants Ferguson,
Burgess, and Hollywood interviewed discussed how they would begin on
the fringes of the conflict, perhaps running with gangs and getting
involved in riots, before being approached by or approaching armed
groups and becoming involved in assassinations or bombings.18
However, while the route into engaging in a terror attack may be long,
many current and former combatants report the importance of ‘critical
incidents’ or ‘trigger moments’ in directing them down this route.19 These
critical incidents were normally attacks on themselves, their family or the
13 Neil Ferguson, Mark Burgess and Ian Hollywood, “Who are the Victims?
Victimhood Experiences in Post Agreement Northern Ireland,” Political Psychology
31:6 (2010): 857-886.
14 Horgan, The psychology of terrorism; Silke, “The Devil you know.”
15 Ibid; Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism I; Laia Balcells, “Rivalry and
revenge: Violence against civilians in conventional civil wars,” International Studies
Quarterly 54 (2010): 291-313; Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social
psychology of defiance”; Silke, “Preface” in Terrorists, victims and society; Horgan,
“The search for a terrorist personality”; Bond, “Why Westerners are driven to join the
jihadist fight”; Silke, “Becoming a terrorist”; Rachel and Specht, Young soldiers: Why
they choose to fight; Speckhard, “Defusing human bombs”; Burgess, Ferguson and
Hollywood, “Rebels’ perspectives of the legacy of past violence”; Post, Sprinzak and
Denny, “The terrorists in their own words.”
16 Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From
discontent to action.”
17 Anthony Oberschall, “Explaining terrorism: The contribution of collective action
theory,” Sociological Theory 22 (2004): 26–37.
18 Burgess, Ferguson, Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From discontent to
action.”
19 Ibid; Horgan, The psychology of terrorism.
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wider community they identified with. For example, Burgess et al. report
examples of former Northern Irish Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries
whose narratives pinpoint their involvement due to violent trigger events.
Likewise, Horgan reports that ninety percent of militants from the Swat
Valley in Pakistan included a drone attack as a trigger moment in their
narratives of becoming involved. While these recollections of critical
incidents fuelling recruitment into armed groups were widely reported and
also recognized by non-combatants, the retrospective nature of research
makes it difficult to unpack whether this choice of rationale is accurate or
devised to justify the violent actions undertaken as a militant.20
Witnessing violence against family, friends or the wider group an
individual identifies with, directly, indirectly or vicariously could suggest
that exposure to these events may cause trauma and possibly Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Speckhard further argues that these
traumatic events can also cause dissociation (a feeling of separation from
the body, thoughts, perceptions and/or emotions), which has been offered
as an explanation for a number of cognitive responses to trauma. Such
trauma may cause an individual to become fixated on revenge and the
defense of the group regardless of risk to one’s life or well-being.21
Clearly, wishing to join an armed group involves identifying with the
people that the group represents, so prospective members need to perceive
themselves as categorically interchangeable with other in-group members.
This heightened identification allows them to become stereotypical ingroup members, taking on the group ideology, culture, and values.
Research has also revealed how, in addition to the individual strongly
identifying with his or her group, identification with role models who
support the actions of the armed group is important in sustaining and
committing the individual to political violence. Burgess and colleagues
found that some Northern Irish paramilitaries were moved to engage in
political violence due to ‘idols’ in their community openly supporting
armed confrontation.22 After interviews with members of armed
Palestinian groups, such as Hamas, Post et al. reflected upon how the
interviewees had upheld religious figures who espoused violence or
revolutionaries such as Ché Guevara as heroes.23

Ibid.
Speckhard, “Defusing human bombs: Understanding suicide terrorism”; Etzel
Cardena and David Spiegel, “Dissociative reactions to the San Francisco Bay area
earthquake of 1989,” American Journal of Psychiatry 150 (1993): 474-478.
22 Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From
discontent to action.”
23 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, “The terrorists in their own words.”

20
21
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Research evidence on the role of ideological commitment to a ‘cause’ in
driving engagement in violence, however, has been mixed.24 Recent
research on the role of ideology in pushing people towards involvement in
politically motivated violence has argued that devotion to sacred political
or religious values, particularly when they are fused to a collective identity,
are important factors in distinguishing those willing to fight and die, from
those who are less willing.25
Additionally, numerous other antecedent factors were reported, which
received less attention or garnered less support, such as a need for a
reduction of uncertainty, to overcome cognitive and emotional dissonance
or create more limited ‘black’ versus ‘white’ choices, which help simplify
the world into good and evil, the just and unjust, heretic and true
believer.26 Kruglanski and colleagues also suggest that a quest for personal
significance constitutes a major motivational force in pushing individuals
towards violent extremism.27
Many of these antecedent factors can be seen to play a role in the detailed
accounts of jihadists such Mubin Shaikh, former al-Qaida (AQ)
sympathizer and undercover counter-terrorism operative for the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service. Shaikh was involved in the arrest of the
Toronto 18 in 2006 and suggested the perceived injustices in his life, his
crisis of identity and his need to right the wrongs as he saw them played
into his decision to join AQ.28 While Mohammed Emwazi aka ‘Jihadi
John’ who is currently fighting in Syria with the Islamic State (IS) forces,
reported systematic harassment by the British Security Services to an
advocacy group and points to events during his arrest in Tanzania as a key

24 Sageman, Understanding terror networks; Bond, “Why Westerners are driven to
join the jihadist fight”; McManus, John, The deadly brotherhood: The American
combat soldier in World War II (New York: Presidio Press, 2003)
25 Scott Atran, Hammad Sheikh and Angel Gomez, “For cause and comrade: Devoted
actors and willingness to fight,” Cliodynamics 5:1 (2014): 41-57; Wagdy Loza, “The
psychology of extremism and terrorism: A Middle-Eastern perspective,” Aggression &
Violent Behavior 12 (2007): 141-155; Francisco G. Sanin, Elizabeth J. Wood,
“Ideology in civil war: Instrumental adoption and beyond,” Journal of Peace
Research 51 (2014): 213-226.
26 Michael J. Hogg and Janice Adelman, “Uncertainty-identity theory: Extreme
groups, radical behavior, and authoritarian leadership,” Journal of Social Issues 69
(2013): 436-454; Hudson, Rex A. The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who
becomes a terrorist and why? Federal Research Division (Washington, D.C.: Library
of Congress, 1999), 20540-24840.
27 Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Belanger, Ama Sheveland,
Malkanthi Hetiarachchi and Rohan Gunaratna, “The psychology of radicalization and
deradicalization: How significance quest impacts violent extremism,” Advances in
Political Psychology 1 (2014): 69-93.
28 Speckhard, Anne and Mubin Shaikh, Undercover Jihadi: Inside the Toronto 18 –
Al Qaida Inspired, Homegrown, Terrorism in the West (McLean, VA: Advances
Press, 2014).
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critical trigger moment.29 While Emwazi’s claims are contested, they
illustrate that narratives around perceived injustices, collective identity,
and critical incidents persist in individual accounts of radicalization, and
as social psychology has consistently shown us, what people believe is a
motive for their conduct is at least as important as the actual sequence of
events.
While this search for an understanding of how an individual can become
radicalized into committing politically or religiously motivated violence is
in its infancy, the search for a model of the conversion process, where the
individual goes from a place of non-engagement to one where he is
committed to the organization and involved in their activities, is not new
and many well-researched suggestions have been made regarding this
process.30 The psychology of religion may offer new insights into this
conversion process, drawing on established frameworks to offer a deeper
and more thorough understanding of the process of radicalization.

Viewing Radicalization through Religious Conversion Motifs
Similar to the area of terrorism, the psychology of religion is a complex
and multi-dimensional phenomenon. The process of religious conversion
has many similarities with the processes involved in radicalized
conversion.31 For example, both conversions are arguably a
transformational process whereby the individual goes from believing in
and adhering to and/or practicing one set of values/teachings, to believing
in, adhering to, and practicing another set of values/teachings.32 Similar
to radicalization, religious transformation also occurs in a ‘dynamic force
field’ of people, events, ideologies, institutions, expectations and
experiences.33 Importantly, the research within the psychology of religion
suggests several major types of conversion that resonate with examples of
radicalization.
Lofland and Skonovd identified six unique religious conversion motifs,
each of which offers a distinct, defining experience that makes the process
of conversion discrete and individual, and which echoes the antecedent
factors discussed previously. The six motifs that they suggest are:
“Case file: Mohammed Emwazi,” Cage UK, May 1, 2015, available at:
http://www.cageuk.org/case/mohammed-emwazi.
30 Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism I.”
31 Hood, Ralph W., Bernard Spilka, Bruce Hunsberger and Richard Gorsuch, The
Psychology of Religion (New York: Gilford Press, 1996).
32 Raymound F. Paloutzian, “Religious conversion and spiritual transformation: A
meaning-system analysis,” in Raymond F. Paloutzian and Crystal L. Park (eds.),
Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality (New York: Guilford, 2005),
331-347.
33 Raymound F. Paloutzian, James T. Richardson and Lewis R. Rambo, “Religious
conversion and personality change,” Journal of Personality 67: 6 (1999): 1047-1079.
29
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intellectual, mystical, experimental, affectional, revivalist, and coercive.34
While these motifs will be discussed individually, it is important to
remember that many converts will combine aspects of multiple motifs in
their conversion.
Intellectual conversion involves the pursuit of knowledge about the group
that the individual plans to join, although this knowledge is usually
derived from secondary sources (books, media, etc.) rather than from oneon-one contact with people that can lay claim to group membership. In
terms of radicalization processes, this would clearly map onto the routes of
many Islamist militants from Europe and elsewhere who initially engaged
with IS, or jihadist sites online in what Neumann refers to as ‘selfrecruitment’ were an individual becomes radicalized ‘virtually’ without
personal contact with other likeminded individuals or militant groups.35
Mystical conversion is viewed as the prototypical conversion motif, and is
exemplified by Saul’s conversion to Paul whilst on the road to Damascus
and reported in Acts 9 in the New Testament Bible. Mystical conversion
involves a critical event or period of stress which triggers a dramatic
feeling of change and signals the onset of new beliefs and behaviors
associated with the new religion.36
While Lofland and Skonovd title this conversion ‘mystical’, it should be
viewed as ‘transformational’ as it comprises of a cognitive rather than
spiritual re-organization. The philosopher Jaspers also recognized the
importance of these “grenzsituationen” or “boundary situations” created
by having to deal with a situation that prior knowledge or rational
objective reasoning cannot prepare a person to overcome.37 Jaspers
believed having to deal with these critical events (such as facing death, the
death of a child, or an inevitable struggle) causes a radical change in an
individual’s thinking, rousing them from normal spontaneous instinctive
thinking, creating a radical change in personality and worldview in which
they take responsibility for their new future. This ‘Pauline’ motif is very
similar to the critical incidents reported by Northern Irish paramilitaries
and Swat Valley militants discussed earlier in this article, and resonate

34 John Lofland and Norman Skonovd, “Conversion motifs,” Journal for the Scientific
Study of Religion 20:4 (1981): 373-385.
35 Neumann, Peter R. “Joining al-Qaida: jihadist recruitment in Europe,” Adelphi
Paper, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: IISS, 2008).
36 Lofland and Skonovd, “Conversion motifs.”
37 Jaspers, Karl, Existential Elucidation, vol. 2 of Philosophy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970).
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with Liht and Savage’s view of radicalization processes that involve
fomented changes in integrative complexity.38
Experimental conversion involves the individual actively exploring their
religious options where the individual may ‘try on’ different aspects of the
new beliefs, experimenting with the ideologies and practices before
deciding on one. K se and Loewenthal, in a study of British Muslim
converts, found that sixty percent of the converts reported ‘trying out’
different aspects of Muslim religious practice, such as dress, prayer, diet,
abstention from alcohol or sexual relations before committing to the
faith.39 Interestingly, Richard Reid, aka the shoe bomber, initially
converted to Islam for better prison food, before joining Brixton and
Finsbury Park Mosques on his release. For terror converts, this behavior
may also involve assessing the available active groups and comparing their
ideologies, courses of action, and track record before making a conversion
decision.
Affectional conversion highlights the importance of interpersonal
relationships in the process of conversion. Indeed, Lofland and Skonovd
argue that personal attachments or a strong liking for members of the
convert’s new faith are central to the process of driving that conversion.
As discussed earlier, interpersonal and familial links are well documented
antecedents to joining armed groups.40
Revivalist conversion relies on the use of crowd conformity to generate
conversion behavior, making use of powerful and emotive speeches and
witnessing family and friends exerting direct pressure on the individual to
convince them to convert. Research with Loyalist paramilitaries illustrates
the role that protest marches and political rallies organized by Protestant
demagogues such as Ian Paisley in radicalizing and mobilizing individuals
to join loyalist paramilitary groups in conjunction with other conversion
processes.41

Horgan, The psychology of terrorism; Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social
psychology of defiance”; Liht, Jose, Savage, Sara. “Preventing violent extremism
through value complexity: Being Muslim being British.” Journal of Strategic Security
6, no. 4 (2013): 44-66.
39 Ali K se and Kate M. Loewenthal, “Conversion motifs among British converts to
Islam,” International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 10 (2000): 101-110.
40 Rachel and Specht, Young soldiers: Why they choose to fight; Speckhard,
“Defusing human bombs”; Sageman, Understanding terror networks; Bond, “Why
Westerners are driven to join the jihadist fight.”
41 Neil Ferguson and James W. McAuley, “Ulster Loyalist Accounts of Armed
Mobilization, Demobilization and Decommissioning,” in Lorenzo Bosi and Gianluca
De Fazio (eds.), The Troubles: Northern Ireland and Social Movements Theories
(Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, pending publication).
38
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Coercive conversion, sometimes previously known as ‘brainwashing’, was
conceived of as being rare by Lofland and Skonovd because specific
conditions are required for it to take place, including but not limited to
food and/or sleep deprivation and, in more severe cases, psychological and
physical torture. Although outright coercive conversions may be rare,
depending on the amount of social, personal, or familial pressure brought
to bear on the individual, many conversions could be said to contain an
element of coercion. Similarly, while many individuals volunteer to join
armed groups, some, such as child soldiers, are clearly coerced, while
others face Hobson’s choice and join groups because they have no other
obvious means of dealing with the poverty and precarious existence they
face in under developed or chaotic war torn countries.

Utilizing Conversion Motifs
It must also be remembered that Lofland and Skonovd highlight that there
is not necessarily one single path to conversion, but that the process is
necessarily multi-layered and complex. So, the present authors often find
a combination of motifs reported amongst converts, for example, K se
and Loewenthal demonstrate that British Muslim converts report a
combination of intellectual, experimental, and affectional motifs in their
biographies.
Rambo builds on Lofland and Skonovd motifs to create an integrative
model of conversion which considers the role of cultural, social, personal,
and religious systems in charting an individual’s conversion experience
(see Table 1).42 The stages involved in Rambo’s systemic stage model map
very closely onto the well-known antecedents of terrorism: With the
demographic suggestions and history of perceived injustices identified by
any number of radicalized individuals represented by the Context; the
critical incident identified by researchers closely resembling the Crisis
stage; and with the incidents encountered at this stage having the potential
to lead to intentional engagement (Quest), prior to making contact with
the new movement (Encounter), and interacting with this movement in a
meaningful and deliberate way (Interaction). The subsequent identity
construction and assimilation into the movement (Commitment) leads to
the consolidation of the identity and experiences and an intention to act
(Consequences).

Rambo, Lewis R., Understanding Religions Conversion (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1993)

42
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Table 1: Rambo’s (1993) Integrative Model of Conversion
Stage of Conversion
Factors to be Evaluated
Process
1. Context
Historical, religious, social, cultural and
personal factors are assessed based on their
ability to promote or impede conversion
2. Crisis
Personal / social (or both) disruption that
stimulated quest
3. Quest
Intentional engagement with crisis and its
resolution
4. Encounter
Recognition of and contact with new
movement
5. Interaction
Multi-layered extended exchange between
convert and movement
6. Commitment
Construction of new identity and become a
valid member of the movement
7. Consequences
Conversion as a result of new commitment
and consolidation of experiences, identities
and commitments

This systemic stage model highlights the complex and multifaceted conditions
that combine to result in radicalization. Each of the stages are visible to
varying degrees in the cases of individuals who have experienced the process
of radicalization, from al-Shabaab supporter Zachary Chesser’s
acknowledgement of the social context as a key driver in his radicalization to
the well-documented online encounters with IS activists by three underage
girls who fled the United States in 2014 to join IS in Syria.43 The
consequences of successful completion of these stages are all too evident,
when the commitment to new identities, beliefs, and ideologies manifest
themselves in the bombing of public areas, the murder of civilians, and the
intent to further proselytise.
If religious conversion motifs are useful in aiding the understanding
radicalization, it would appear that Rambo’s suggestions provide a rational
and effective starting point—issues of culture, society, and the individual
are important not only to religious conversion, but are prevalent in the
first-hand accounts of conversion to terrorism by researchers that have
sought face-to-face interactions. We suggest that those interested in
43“Senate

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,” Zachary
Chesser: A case study in online Islamist radicalization and its meaning for the threat
of homegrown terrorism,” Testimony before the Majority and Minority Staff Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, February
2012, available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=701274I; Rita Katz, “From
Teenage Colorado Girls to Islamic State Recruits: A Case Study in Radicalization via
Social Media,” Rethinking Islam-with new age Islam.blogspot, November 20, 2014,
available at: news.siteintelgroup.com/blog.index.php/emtry/309-from-teenagecolorado-girls0-to-islamic-state-recruits-a-case-study-in-radicalization-via-socialmedia.
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understanding or countering this process should explore these motifs
further to help develop the models of radicalization based on pyramids or
staircases which are currently utilized.44

Conclusion
To understand radicalization and engagement in violent extremism,
researchers and policy makers require comprehensive models which
incorporate micro, meso, macro and exo factors, such as intra-individual
psychological motivations, community influences and the role of ideology
in the analysis. To achieve this, we propose that scholars and practitioners
examine research from across the globe that focuses on a range of groups,
both active and disbanded, to explore the processes evident in people who
engage in violent extremism.
While viewing this process as a transformation from non-engagement to
active commitment, we believe that exploring the psychology of religious
conversion research offers useful insights and models for understanding
these processes at a variety of levels of abstraction, while integrating a
variety of conditions, factors, and actors into the analysis. Radicalization
and religious conversion share many similarities and the conversion
motifs and models offer ready templates that can assist in building and
managing the understanding of the complex, multifaceted radicalization
processes currently taking place.

McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways
toward terrorism”; Fathali Moghaddam, “The staircase to terrorism: A psychological
exploration,” American Psychologist 60 (2005): 161-169.
44
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